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LSE	Continental	Breakfast	10:	Brexit	and
multilateralism
Multilateral	institutions	–	from	the	EU	to	NATO	to	the	G-summits	–	are	under
strain.	How	does	Brexit	fit	into	this	trend?	Horatio	Mortimer	(LSE)	reports	on	an
expert	discussion	held	at	the	LSE	under	Chatham	House	rules	in	June	2018.
Brexit,	Germany	and	the	multilateral	system
Brexit	is	bad	news	for	the	EU,	and	perhaps	especially	for	Germany,	the	EU’s
largest	and	richest	member.	Many	German	industries	are	closely	integrated	into
the	UK	economy,	and	supply	chains	will	not	cope	with	the	border	delays	that	are
the	inevitable	consequence	of	leaving	the	Single	Market.	Nevertheless,	German
industry	is	resigned	to	Brexit,	and	as	the	representative	of	one	major	German	car
company	was	reported	to	say,	Brexit	is	only	‘about	number	eleven’	on	their	list	of
headaches.	The	priority	is	to	make	sure	that	the	rest	of	the	Single	Market	stays
intact.	That	is	why	firms	that	benefit	from	it	are	unmoved	by	appeals	from	the	UK	–	such	as	Theresa	May’s	Lancaster
House	speech	-that	propose	special	deals	in	particular	sectors	such	as	automobiles	and	finance.
Perhaps	a	greater	concern	is	that	Germany	will	lose	an	important	ally	in	moulding	the	Union	towards	a	more	open
economy,	with	less	bureaucracy	and	more	fiscal	discipline.	Without	the	UK,	Germany	may	no	longer	be	able	to
muster	a	blocking	minority	of	fiscally-conservative	countries.
Theresa	May	and	Angela	Merkel	at	a	bilateral	in	Berlin,	July	2018.	Photo:	Number	10	via	a	CC-
BY-NC-ND	2.0	licence
Another	concern	is	that	Germany	will	come	to	dominate	the	EU,	just	as	it	has	the	Eurozone,	and	that	this	may	not	be
in	its	own	long-term	self-interest	–	it	might	even	threaten	peace	and	prosperity.	The	raison	d’être	for	European
integration,	as	originally	laid	out	in	the	Schuman	Plan,	was	to	resolve	and	settle	‘the	German	question’	once	and	for
all.	Later,	during	the	negotiation	of	the	‘two	plus	four’	treaty	between	the	Second	World	War	Allies	and	East	and	West
Germany,	which	allowed	the	reunification	of	Germany	in	1990,	both	Margaret	Thatcher	and	Francois	Mitterrand	were
worried	about	an	over-mighty	Germany.
LSE Brexit: LSE Continental Breakfast 10: Brexit and multilateralism Page 1 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-07-18
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/07/18/lse-continental-breakfast-10-brexit-and-multilateralism/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
Thatcher	believed	that	‘the	German	problem’	was	inherent	in	German	national	character	with	its	roots	in	the	late
formation	of	the	German	nation	state,	which	caused	it	to	veer	‘unpredictably	between	aggression	and	self-doubt’.	A
reunited	Germany,	she	believed,	would	dominate	western	Europe,	and	its	economic	dynamism	would	lead	it	to	look
east	as	well	as	west,	which	would	destabilise	Europe.	A	close	Franco-British	alliance	and	a	continuing	American
presence	were	together	necessary	to	contain	German	power.	According	to	Thatcher,	European	integration	would
only	increase	German	dominance.
Mitterrand,	on	the	other	hand,	(along	with	most	of	the	British	government),	believed	that	European	integration	was
the	only	way	to	bind	Germany	to	the	West	and	to	European	institutions.	The	German	chancellor,	Helmut	Kohl,	was
cautious	about	the	sequence	of	European	integration,	and	wanted	both	economic	convergence	and	political	union	to
come	before	monetary	union.	Implementing	EMU	first	was	a	compromise	allowing	a	more	rapid	integration	to	keep
pace	with	German	unification.
More	recently,	the	case	for	European	unity	has	generally	been	framed	as	an	answer	to	problems	arising	from
globalisation.	Yet	many	Europeans	seem	to	be	turning	away	from	integration.	What	has	gone	wrong?
One	factor	may	be	Russia	–	an	aggrieved	former	superpower	that	has	been	watching	its	smaller	neighbours	defect
towards	Europe.	Recognising	that	acts	of	external	aggression	are	likely	to	have	the	effect	of	increasing	solidarity	and
strengthening	the	EU,	the	Kremlin	has	instead	been	working	hard	to	foment	nationalist	sentiment	inside	the	EU.
Ironically,	globalisation	is	the	very	reason	many	Europeans	have	turned	against	Europe.	They	feel	more	at	home	and
safer	in	their	nation	state.	Nationalists	have	achieved	electoral	breakthroughs	across	Europe	by	arguing	that
globalisation	can	be	rolled	back,	and	that	problems	like	mass	migration,	perceptions	of	an	unjust	financial	system,
and	the	effects	of	climate	change	could	all	best	be	handled	at	the	national	level.		Then	came	Emmanuel	Macron,	with
his	winning	slogan	‘L’Europe	qui	protège’	–	Europe	that	protects.	This	sparked	similar	movements	in	other	countries,
including	Germany,	with	the	‘pulse	of	Europe’.
Macron	has	also	made	concrete	proposals	to	reinforce	European	unity.	Germany’s	support	was	crucial	–	but	it	was
not	given,	partly	because	some	key	members	of	Angela	Merkel’s	party	saw	calls	for	European	solidarity	as	a	grab	for
German	money.	Angela	Merkel’s	strategic	hesitation,	or	what	Ulrich	Beck	called	‘Merkiavelli’,	also	played	a	part.
Germany	has	benefited,	perhaps	more	than	any	other	country,	from	the	normative	project	we	call	‘the	West’	–	the
multilateral	institutions	built	on	the	values	of	the	Enlightenment,	the	French	and	American	revolutions	and	the
Wilsonian	Principles.		Economically,	Germany	relies	on	the	open	markets	provided	by	other	countries	through	the
EU,	the	WTO	and	other	agreements	that	allow	it	to	run	huge	trade	surpluses,	while	in	security	terms,	it	relies	on
NATO.	When	Donald	Trump	complained	that	Germany	was	free-riding	in	NATO,	he	was	only	repeating	in	less	polite
terms	what	Obama	had	previously	said.	Trump,	however,	called	into	question	the	Article	5	guarantee	of	assistance.
He	later	backtracked,	but	a	security	guarantee	is	something	that	only	works	when	people	really	believe	in	it.
Since	neither	open	markets	nor	NATO	now	seem	to	be	American	priorities,	the	EU	is	critical	to	upholding	western
values	and	institutions,	and	many	are	dismayed	at	Germany’s	apparent	failure	to	embrace	Macron’s	reforms.
Merkel’s	recent	interview	with	the	Frankfurter	Allgemeine	Zeitung	offered	positive	remarks	on	tackling	the	European
refugee	crisis	and	security,	but	a	much	more	muted	response	to	Eurozone	reforms	–	calibrated	to	make	them
palatable	to	the	Bundestag.	The	German	parliament	has	a	powerful	aversion	to	any	suggestion	of	a	transfer	union,
which	would	redistribute	some	of	the	excess	profits	that	Germany	and	others	made	thanks	to	the	euro,	to	members
for	whom	the	currency	has	caused	financial	difficulties.		Many	on	both	sides	of	the	argument	argue	that	the	present
arrangements	for	the	recapitalisation	of	the	European	Central	Bank	are	in	fact	already	a	transfer	union	by	the	back
door.
Unfortunately,	Merkel’s	strategy	of	keeping	options	open	can	lead	to	situations	where	only	bad	options	remain.
Previous	chancellors	saw	crises	on	the	distant	horizon,	took	bold	decisions	and	then	persuaded	the	German	people
to	get	behind	them.	Germany	was	not	automatically	a	‘Western’	country,	but	German	leaders	took	tough	decisions	to
make	it	one.	Konrad	Adenauer	first	drove	Western	integration;	Willy	Brandt	drove	through	his	policy	of
Ostpolitik;	Helmut	Schmidt	persuaded	his	country	to	accept	medium	range	missiles;	Kohl	led	them	to	the	common
currency;	and	Gerhard	Schroeder	pushed	through	the	2010	Agenda,	which	implemented	structural	reforms	to	restore
German	economic	dynamism	after	reunification.
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While	Brexit	is	likely	to	be	disastrous	for	the	UK,	it	might	increase	the	chances	of	Macron’s	reforms	being	agreed.
The	value	of	multilateral	institutions
The	failure	of	Western	politicians	to	protect	the	multilateral	system	may	be	because	people	take	it	for	granted.		The
euphemistic	“WTO	option”	of	a	no-deal	Brexit	is	an	example	of	the	assumption	that	the	rules-based	international
trading	regime	is	a	constant	bedrock,	despite	the	fact	that	Trump	often	seems	bent	on	dismantling	it.
Multilateral	institutions	are	crucial	to	maintaining	relatively	effective	international	relations,	and	they	are	an	innovation
with	a	short	history.	It	took	70	years	to	build	them	up	to	their	current	–	far	from	perfect	–	but	relatively	useful
condition.	Their	predecessors	were	the	League	of	Nations,	which	failed	in	the	1930s,	and	a	brief	moment	following
the	defeat	of	Napoleon,	with	the	Concert	of	Europe.	With	these	exceptions,	international	relations	have	been
bilateral.	At	the	Peace	of	Westphalia,	for	example,	the	109	delegations	never	met	in	plenary,	but	negotiated
bilaterally	with	each	other.	To	understand	how	inefficient,	opaque	and	prone	to	breed	mistrust	bilateral	relations	are,
one	can	look	at	the	exchanges	that	took	place	before	1914,	as	documented	by	TG	Otte.
There	is	an	inevitable	trade-off	between	efficiency	and	legitimacy,	so	multilateral	organisations	fall	on	a	spectrum
between	coalitions	of	the	willing	–	such	as	NATO	or	the	‘G’	summits	–	and	the	more	universal	organisations	within
the	UN	system.	However,	many	of	these	seem	to	be	in	trouble,	as	the	recent	G7	meeting	in	Quebec	showed.
The	EU	was	always	dependent	on	NATO.	The	Schuman	Plan	couldn’t	have	been	put	into	effect	without	the
underlying	security	guarantee.	But	the	EU	was	also	established	as	a	security	organisation,	and	the	two	institutions
work	together.	The	EU’s	purpose	was	to	create	good	political	relations:	Jean	Monnet’s	theory	was	that	you	become
friends	by	doing	things	together,	rather	than	you	do	things	together	because	you	are	friends.	The	more	things	you	do
together,	the	better	friends	you	become.	Member	states	are	in	a	continual	process	of	negotiation,	so	that	it	becomes
strategically	important	to	quarrel	as	little	as	possible	with	your	fellow	members,	because	you	never	know	when	you
will	need	their	support.
The	downside	of	this	dynamic	is	that	when	you	are	not	a	member,	it	works	against	you.	Outside	the	Union,	if	you
have	some	contention	with	just	one	member	state,	which	is	clearly	of	little	consequence	to	the	others,	they	will	all
firmly	oppose	you,	because	they	know	they	need	that	member’s	support	in	some	other	negotiation,	and	they	can’t
afford	to	alienate	them.
Furthermore,	by	leaving	the	EU	the	UK,	which	is	comparatively	liberal	in	trade	matters,	may	tip	the	balance	of	the	EU
towards	protectionism.	Consequently	the	UK	may	find	that	the	EU	it	has	left	is	more	difficult	to	negotiate	with	than	it
was	while	it	still	belonged.
The	rise	of	China
If	western	multilateralism	is	weakening,	is	China	showing	signs	of	building	a	new	multilateral	system?	China	is	fast
emerging	as	a	great	power	with	an	elaborate	and	strategic	master	plan.	China	seems	happy	to	use	parts	of	the
existing	multilateral	system	–	including	parts	that	constrain	it,	such	as	WTO	dispute	settlement,	and	the	peer	review
process	in	the	Financial	Action	Task	Force,	which	works	against	money	laundering.	But	it	also	seems	to	reject
exactly	these	sorts	of	mechanisms	in	other	multilateral	bodies,	refusing	to	join	the	OECD	Anti-Bribery	Convention,	or
Export	Credit	Arrangements.
Meanwhile,	China	is	creating	new	institutions	such	as	the	New	Development	Bank	–	an	alternative	to	the	World	Bank
–	with	the	other	BRICS	countries.	It	has	also	established	a	new	emergency	credit	facility	that	parallels	the	IMF,	and
its	Belt	and	Road	Initiative	is	a	massive	international	effort	to	build	economic	cooperation	–	including	initiatives	to
combat	climate	change,	which	some	have	compared	to	the	Marshall	Plan.
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Meanwhile,	the	language	of	diplomacy	has	changed.	Trump	is	the	most	obvious	example,	but	certainly	not	the	only
one.	Where	has	this	come	from,	and	why	is	it	so	much	more	evident	in	the	West?	One	answer	is	the	explosion	of
social	media,	and	the	weakening	of	the	old	hierarchies	of	top-down	channels	of	communication.		It	has	become	far
more	difficult	for	‘the	authorities’	to	cut	through.	Attention	is	the	basic	currency	of	the	internet,	and	standards	of
decorum	and	consideration	are	diminished,	while	the	ability	to	gain	attention	by	whatever	means	has	become	all-
important.	It	is	no	longer	sufficient	to	convince	a	few	influencers	at	the	top	of	the	establishment	of	the	merits	of
international	cooperation.	Social	media	in	China,	on	the	other	hand,	is	still	under	hierarchical	control.
The	end	of	the	Cold	War	is	another	factor	in	the	apparent	decline	in	Western	liberal	values.	During	the	Cold	War,	it
was	much	easier	to	justify	forceful	action	to	defend	those	values.	China’s	model	of	‘meritocratic	authoritarian
capitalism’	seems	less	antagonistic	than	the	Soviet	Union	did.	Eventually,	perhaps,	China’s	insistence	on	fealty	to
the	Chinese	Communist	Party,	which	itself	seems	to	be	becoming	less	internally	mobile,	will	seem	less	palatable	if
China’s	growing	influence	brings	it	into	more	frequent	conflict	with	other	nations.
Brexit	is	both	a	result	of	the	unravelling	of	the	multilateral	system	and	Western	values,	and	contributes	to	it.	The	more
the	system	unravels,	the	less	confidence	the	world	has	in	the	ability	of	multilateral	institutions	to	protect	their
interests.	It	is	far	from	clear	what	can	be	done	to	reverse	this	vicious	circle.
This	post	is	an	account	of	a	discussion	held	at	the	LSE.	It	does	not	represent	the	views	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the
LSE.	For	a	fuller	account	and	a	list	of	participants,	see	the	complete	write-up.
Horatio	Mortimer	is	a	business	partnerships	manager	in	the	LSE’s	Research	Division	and	a	public	affairs
consultant.
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